



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Cicero's Prince.

THE
REASONS
AND
COUNSELS
For Settlement and
Good Government
OF A
KINGDOM.
Collected out of
CICERO'S Works.

By T. R. Esq;

L O N D O N,
Printed for S. Mearne, Bookbinder to
the Kings Most Excellent Majesty,
and are to be sold at his house
in Little-Britain, 1668.





To His

Grace the DUKE of
MONMOUTH
AND
BACCLEUGH, &c.



His Piece was once a
Jewel (wrapt up in La-
tine) in the Cabinet of
the Renowned Prince
Henry, and composed
by an excellent Artist out of the rich
Mines of that famous Statesman, and

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Orator *M. Tullius Cicero*. It hath in it Maximes, which void of all stains, and Flaws of *Machiavillian* Interest, are raised only upon principles of Honor and Vertue, which best become a Prince. In the discourse, they are directed to a Sovereign, but may be of no less use to any great person, whose Birth or Quality may render him capable of Derivative Authority, in the management of affairs of State, and what is Honorable, and becoming a Prince, must needs be so in his Ministers, who should be his Imitators. Your Graces qualifications, and Years may reasonably expect ere long to be called to employment, in which your care and good conduct of your self may satisfy the expectation of the world, and divert the censures of a malicious Age, which your Grace
pre-

The Epistle Dedicatory.

prevents by considering your station, and that though your years are but few, yet Great Men as they are planted near the Prince, ought to be (like Trees on rich ground) sooner ripe for affairs then other of meaner condition, which cannot be without an early application of themselves to some serious thoughts of business, either in the practice, and observation, of present transactions, or by reading what hath been done in the world before them; but of this your Grace is already sensible; so that I have selected this for its Brevity only, to lye by you as a Memorial to prompt you to put these Maximes, in time, into such practice, as may gain you that Honor and esteem in the World, to which with a Laudable Ambition, you ought to aspire, and render your self serviceable to your King

The Epistle Dedicatory.

and Country , which is, in this the
sole design , and most earnest de-
fire of

Your Graces

in all duties of a faithful

and humble servant.

T. R.

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Cicero's



Cicero's Prince.

C H A P. I.

*The Excellency of Government and Power,
the Cause, and Original of Civil Life,
Laws, Commonwealths, Society and
Cities.*

Very Nature which is not Solitary and Simple, but connexed and joyned with some other, must of necessity have something within in it self that Governs; as in Man the Understanding, in Beasts something like it, whence their Appetites arise; on a Republick Magistracy, which orders and prescribes what

B

is

is Just, Profitable, and suitable to the Laws.

Nothing therefore is more agreeable to the Equitable condition of Nature, then Government, without which no Family, no Society of Men, no Nation, not even Mankind, nor the world it self can subsist; For the Universe obeyeth God, and to his Dictates and Commands, the Seas, Earth, and the Being of Mankind is subject, as to their Supreme Law-giver.

To these when we apply and add Good Affections, they produce that Foundation of stability which we desire in Government; For Virtue is not Rude, Cruel, or Proud, but assisting to the Defence of all Men, best consults for their safety; ordained by Nature as the surest Guard of Kingly Power, and Humane Society, to reconcile and unite them.

Time was when Men, like Beasts, lived in open Fields, sustaining life with wilde Food, not acting so much by the Reason of the Soul, as strength of the Body; having then no knowledge of Divine Religion

ligion or Humane Offices. No man reflected on lawful Marriage, or regarded the Legitimacy of his Children, altogether ignorant of that benefit, which arising from the Laws of Equity; so that through Error and Ignorance, Blind and Rash Desire predominant in the Minde, abused the strength of the Body to satisfy it self by pernicious Force. Some therefore who first excelled in Virtue and Wisdom, collected the dispersed into one place, and out of that Barbarity brought them to Justice and Humanity. And then those things which were of Publike Utility, termed by us common Conventions of men, after called Civil Societies, with the Invention of Divine and Humane Laws, in Houses built together denominated Cities, and encompassed them with walls.

C H A P. 2.

*The Excellency of Regal Power, the Cause
and Origen of Kings and Laws.*

But that I may come to things nearer and more known to us ; All Nations anciently were Govern'd by Kings, which kind of Government was at first conferred on Persons most Just ; and this in our Republick (while subject to Regal Power) was most highly valued, and derived to Posterity, still remaining in those who now Reign with Purple, the Scepter and other Ensigns of Royal Authority.

But the well moderated Monarchy, to Me, seems not only to have been of old constituted among the *Medes* (according to *Herodotus*) but even among our Ancestors for the fruition of Justice ; for when in the beginning, the multitude was oppressed by such as exceeded them in wealth, they immediately had recourse to some one person, eminent for Virtue, who protecting the weak from
injury,

injury, kept all degrees of men by exact Rules of Justice within the bounds of Equity, so that Kings and Laws had the same Origin; for equal Right was that which all men sought, and if they obtained it from a just and good man they were content, but failing of it, they then invented Laws which spoke with the same voice to all Persons. It is therefore most evident, that such only were chosen to command, of whose Justice the People had great opinion; and from them alone (if they likewise were prudent) they believed all good to be derived to them.

C H A P. 3.

The Difficulties, Arts and Foundations of Government.

BUT these disaffected to Monarchy, would not pretend a total exemption from Obedience, but not always to be subject to one; it therefore imports a Great and Wise Prince, by his Studies of the best Arts and Learning,

to render himself such in this high Command, as nothing may seem wanting to compleat him for Government, which of all Arts is the most difficult.

The Foundations and parts of it, which a Prince must preserve and defend, even with the hazard of his Life, are Religion, the Power of Magistrates, the Authority of Senates, Laws, Ancient Customes, Justice, Publick Faith, his Provinces, Allies, the Dignity of his Crown, Militia, and Treasury.

Yet are there two Things by which all Requisite to Government in a State may be secured, *viz.* Knowledge how to Govern, and exact Discipline in the Administration of the Laws.

The first of these (of great Advantage and absolutely necessary to a Prince) containeth in it knowledge of Armies, Camps, Battles, Sieges, Provisions for Troops, &c. with all things pertaining to War.

The other of no less necessity, but often of greater Utility (its subject Matter considered) is understanding Civil Affairs, the Authority of the Publick Laws,

Re-

Records, and Examples of Antiquity, and whatsoever else may advance and conduce to the Benefit of the Commonwealth.

But although these things are set down in Precepts, yet is it too difficult to be conformable to them in all parts of a Politick Life, because what is in the hands of Fortune is to be govern'd (according to Accidents) by time, and so to be provided for by Council, which was the custome of our Ancestors, who to all new Emergencies of Time, did always accommodate new Resolves.

So that this knowledge in Publick Affairs (which we here mention) is acquired, not by the daily affected talking of any particular Minister, nor Formal Determination of Schools, or Republicks painted out in Books, but a diligent observation of greatest Actions, the memory of many, and practice of more, by a continual exercise and serious use of such things as are daily observed to have been of Advantage or disadvantage to the Commonwealth.

C H A P. 4.

Of the Office of a Prince in General what he ought to know, do and consider.

IN the administration of Matters of greatest moment, there are Various Acts of Councils and Times which depend wholly upon the Prince, and therefore require his greatest care and diligence.

For the Publick being to be formed and governed by Councils, and honest and profitable Actions, it is necessary the Princes Judgment and Virtue should appear most eminent.

And that his Empire may be preserved, that Prudence (which is to be seen in his Choice of Good or Evil Ministers) is to be quickned by his calling of Councils, continuing or dismissing them, in requiring, giving, taking, communicating, changing, and rejecting advice; as likewise in Actions, by undertaking, executing, or laying aside designs.

All which, as they concern the Common-

monwealth, the chief is, perfectly to understand the Military Force, what Treasure, what Allies, what Confederates, what Stipendaries, and by what Tyes of Amity, Conditions, and Leagues they are obliged; To maintain a constant custom of determining Causes, to consider Examples of Ancestors, the Original of their Power, Publick Laws, the Intent, Manners, and Discipline of the Commonwealth.

For as a Pilot purposeth to himself a safe Course, a Physician the Recovery of his Patient, and the General of an Army Victory; so the Design of a Prince should be the Happiness of his people, that they may be strong in Power, abundant in plenty; Great and Glorious in Virtue and Honor, and to effect this work, the best Princes should be most industrious.

Yet is it not to be expected they should have their eyes upon all things; but if knowingly they omit any thing, it is a great Crime, and they contract something of anothers guilt, if their care could have prevented it; but if any thing
happen

happen which they could not obviate, the fault is not theirs. And this hath often befallen the wisest men, who (as the best Pilot cannot withstand the Fury of a Tempest) could not overcome the violence and insult of Fortune; yet this, few rightly consider, all things being expected from Him, to whom nothing ought (at least) to be refused, to perform all things conducing to the Publick good.

I will not reflect on the miserable condition of our Provinces in their Government, wherein Diligence is Faction, Neglect Dishonor, Severity dangerous, Bounty unacceptable, common conversation treacherous, compliance pernicious; every man seems chearful, while most are discontented; Malice secret, Diffimulation open, obsequiously observing their new Governors, honoring them when present, and deserting when absent.

Many of these things happen to the best of Princes, but they (like valiant men) should trust so much to their fortitude, as not to fear any assault of Fortune,

tune, by performing all things with Wisdom, Courage, and Justice.

For though many men weigh Councils by Events, and conclude that whoever hath had Success, he foresaw much, and who was not so Fortunate understood little; it was always my judgment to value every mans Virtue or Fortune by his Actions, not by events: Who can promise to perpetuate happiness to his Country? or who so hold the Helm of Government in all weathers, as not to be shaken in a violent Storm? Let it be your endeavor to keep the Ship steady and in a safe Course, and when the Windes rise, it is sufficient if your Art and care be not wanting, for that is all that Virtue can perform.

Be sure always (whether busied in Publick Affairs, or diverted by Recreations) to consider the Tenure of your Power, by what Virtue, Care, and Honor of your Ancestors it was acquired, augmented and preserved, and how it is to be maintained, governed and confirmed by your Own.

Themis.

* *Miltiades* was that brave *Athenian* General who with 10000 men discomfited the *Persian* Army of 600000, in the battle of *Marathon*, the honor of which victory made *Themistocles* ambitious to perform things as great.

* *Themistocles* walked the streets in the night because he could not sleep, and being asked the Reason, replied that *Miltiades* his Trophies kept him waking.

C H A P. 5.

Of Prudence in Councils and Actions.

But that you may proceed on Principles well-weigh'd, and diligently explored: First deliberately consider the Thing to be put in execution, how Just and Honest, and if you have Power to effect it. Before you venture upon it, make all diligent preparation, and preponderate the Events, whether good or evil, that nothing may happen which may cause you to say, *You did not think on't.*

In Counsels, those are always most safe, which carry with them reasons of establishing Peace, and nothing of
Trea-

Treachery, on which

* ground had my Advice been followed, we had continued, if not the best, at least some part of that

Republick which is now totally subverted.

* Cicero endeavor'd to reconcile *Pompey* and *Caesar* before they began the War, as appears by his 14. Epistle to *Caesar*, and elsewhere.

Let the better Opinion always take place, act nothing but on probable (good) grounds, for nothing is in it self honorable wherein there is not a consideration of Judgment; and therefore you shall do well maturely to consider that, which once put in execution, cannot be revoked or repressed. I had rather many should judge you to have acted unwarily, then a few dishonestly; and in all your Actions be guided more by consideration of the matter then the witness, that you may be esteemed as a light shining in darkness, and an imitator of our Senate, who never separated their Profit from their Honor.

Their principles are good, who advise you to do no Act (whether good or bad) of which your Judgment is doubtful;

ful ; for Equity, shines by it self , but Doubt signifieth some apprehension of injury. Think not it becomes a King to let his Will be the Rule of his Life, nor that they are happy that live as they will ; for to desire that which is not seemly, is a degree of Misery, nor are you so unhappy in not obtaining your Will, as in enjoying what you ought not to desire.

You are the Chief in great Commands and Provinces, bear therefore a Minde as Great and Honorable , that you may appear, not only to be above all men, but above their Vices ; to contemne all libidinous desires, to judge freely, to consult more for the peoples profit then their pleasure , to provide for the safety of all men against powerful and dangerous persons ; and in these things to give way to none, but excel all.

Keep it always in your Memory, that the Actions of a Prince are naked to Censure, therefore consider your Dignity.

Let nothing be done that may leave a dangerous imitation of your example
to

to posterity, for many think what they do by example is of Right, and often add something, nay much of their own, but it becomes a great Prince to do that, which may be, not only of greatest present advantage, but for future example.

C H A P. 6.

Of Prudence in preventing Mischiefs, suppressing Commotions in their beginnings, &c.

BE always Vigilant to prevent Mischiefs, and see that nothing fester under the skin which may endanger you before it can be known or cured; Reason and diligence may do much, seconded by Counsel on the Matter and Time.

It cannot derogate from the Dignity of a Prince, which was held decent in *Agamemnon*, the chief of Kings, to have a * *Nestor* to consult.

Homer makes that great Commander of the *Greeks*, never to wish that he had

* A Wise Counsellor to King *Agamemnon*.

Ajax esteemed one of the most valiant *Greeks* that besieged *Troy*.

ten such as *Ajax*, but often ten like *Nestor*, which could he have obtained, he was confident *Troy* might soon have been destroyed. Be sure therefore always to entertain near you such a person, with whom you may communicate all your concerns; one which loves you, is wise, replies to all your demands with integrity, without dissimulation or reserve. In sudden and pressing occasions be of so present a courage, as not to shift any part of the weight to other shoulders, but be to your self a Senate.

Nothing is more dangerous, then to give time to such as attempt innovation to confirm themselves; be sure always to cut them off in the midst of their designs, lest they attain to the end; for that Mischief which may be easily suppressed in its beginnings, if suffered to grow up, may prove too strong.

Therefore timely to suppress impiety and not to suffer it encrease by impunity, is not only profitable but necessary, by which you may not only put a period to the insolency of wicked men, but to your own Anxiety.

Plancus

Plancus advised very wisely in the War against *Antony*, to prevent the strengthening of the enemy, and the apprehensions of our own men, wherein had celerity been used, the Commonwealth, by the de-

Plancus commanded the Armies in *Gallia Transalpina*, and came to the relief of *Decimus Brutus*, when besieged in *Mutina* (now called *Modena*) but seeing *Lepidus* joyned with *Antony*, would not hazard to fight them, but retired to preserve his Province, which must have been lost and he been defeated.

struction of those Traytors, had still stood firm in the possession of Victory. He, a knowing Statesman, was not ignorant of the Weight and advantage of every moment of Time, and of the difference whether the same thing be Resolved, undertaken, and Acted before or after. Had all those severe Decrees made at that tumultuous time been put in execution, either the day when I pronounced them, and not delayed from time to time; or when they were undertaken, not procrastinated before put in action, that War had never been.

It is prudence rather to punish wicked Subjects when in your power, then to

C

enter-

entertain perpetual apprehensions of them. Yet in this four things are mainly to be considered, for prevention of a rash or loose Act, and shewing moderation, which best becomes a Prince.

1. To be severe on the guilty Leaders and Contrivers, and merciful to the Multitude, who offend rather by chance than design.

2. To act all things by Publick Justice and Counsel, lest you seem rather to punish by violence and force, than Law.

3. Not to be swayd by conjectures of anothers sense, or blind suspicion, lest either the Innocent be oppress'd by the detraction and envy of malicious men, or to evacuate some ill humors, the very bowels and all the veins be open'd.

4. But chiefly, use deliberation and prudence, that you may not only have Counsel in providing, but judgment in performing, lest that very mischief, which you apprehend, you seek, so to prevent, as (when it might happily be avoided) you meet and draw it upon you, which is a very foolish effect of Fear.

In

In suppressing present Mischiefs, be sure to have an eye to the future, lest they grow by degrees upon you; leave no roots behind, for from wilde and venemous plants (though they may be cut up) they sometimes (from small Fibres) spring up again, and get strength to renew Rebellion. It is not less safe utterly to purge away the last parts (of a distemper) then to repell the first, but both with judgment, nothing carelessly, lest in a short time the Mischief dilate it self; for as after some recovery from a disease, a Relapse is most dangerous; so their trouble is much more vehement, who having almost extinguished, and allayed a War, are constrained to renew it.

Beware lest the Punisher of one delinquency, prove the Author of another of more force then the first. In * our Troubles, the cause of the suppression of every first Mischief, was always the Ground, whence a second sprung worse then the former.

* *Augustus* made Commander of an Army against *Antony*, by that means obtained power to gain the Empire.

C H A P. 7.

Cautions to be observed in Commotions, and causes of Sedition.

BELIEVE it a great Folly, from a private Pique, to express open enmity; or when you cannot hurt, to shew a desire to do harm.

His counsel is most approved, who thought it best to strengthen himself by recruiting his Army, with multiplied

Cæsar vvhhen he first aspired to the Empire, and commanded in Gallia.

auxiliaries, that when he should openly declare his Intentions, found it not dangerous

(against the sense of some) to make known what he intended to assert. To attain the ends of this resolution, he diffembled many things, by which how dangerous an untimely declaration had been without preparation, he saw in the ruine of his Colleague.

Have a care that Great men under pretence of common affairs or business, have no conventions to take up Arms or raise tumults.

If

If there be Factions among the people or Nobility, be diligent to reconcile them; and if Piques grow high (as by heats of opinions, and endeavors for employments it often happens; for in these every one is Tenacious and will not easily recede) let them not proceed to bitterness, nor so disagree, as not to consent for the publick safety, but rather contend who shall shew most affection to the Commonwealth.

In Publick Assemblies use Moderation, lest the people be incensed by some turbulent and rash tongue, as the Spur to Sedition, like those of *Greece*, all whose Republickes were govern'd by the Temerity of Long-setting Assemblies; to omit therefore this *Greece*, so long shaken and afflicted by her own Counsels, that more ancient, which once flourished in Wealth, Empire, and Glory, was ruin'd by this one Mischief, *viz.* the Immoderate *Liberty and Licence of Publick Assemblies. When in the Senate Men unskilful, rude, and ignorant of all

* The Senate of *Athens* especially notorious for Faction.

affairs had place; then they undertook unnecessary and unprofitable Wars, conferred the most eminent employments on Seditious Persons, and banished the most deserving. And if this was then done in *Athens* (the most glorious City, not only of *Greece*, but of all the world) what (think you) was the moderation of the Assemblies of *Phrygia* and *Mysia*.

We often see the Sea (which in its own nature is quiet) tossed and troubled by the Force of Windes; so the people of themselves inclining to peace, by the voices of Seditious men (as by violent storms) are raised into fury, which to prevent must be your care.

Be no less industrious to preserve your own esteem from the wounds of dispersed, and Seditious speeches, nor let it suffice that the offender repents, but let his punishment deter others from committing the like.

All Libellers, and Scurrilous Poets,

* Wherein the Laws are to be punished
made by the Decemviri, for example. Our
and those fetched from twelve * Tables
Greece were written,
and always held most sacred by the *Romans*,

though

though they declared very few crimes Capital, yet this was decreed such, If any person published or composed Verses infamous, or mischievous to another, how much more to a Prince.

It should likewise be your care, that no man speak rashly of the State, or disperse uncertain Rumors, in any condition of the Commonwealth, especially in time of war, and more especially in Civil, which for the most part is governed by Opinion and report.

P. Varienus returning to *Rome* from *Reate* (where he had been Prætor) travelling by night, two young men on white Horses, told him that King *Perfes* was * that day taken,

which he related to the Senate; at first,

* King of *Macedon*, and subdued by *P. Æmilius*.

as if he had spoken rashly, he was committed to prison; but not long after, Letters arriving from *P. Æmilius* confirming his report, he was not only freed from all future service, but rewarded by the Senate with Lands.

But in all these things great caution is to be used, not to insinuate any thing

to Ears prejudiced, which desire the death of their Enemies, or Fear, or Hate them; neither to such, as like ill Hounds take up all Scents, and wanting Crimes infer what is false, which in fear and danger are not only believed easily, but invented with impunity. This sort of Men, contriving destruction for others, you ought to look on, as a Pest to your self, whom they would involve in the same.

Give no matter of probable discourse to Malevolent Tongues, which if once gained, they will strive to alienate the good-will both of your Allies and Subjects.

Avoid all occasions of infamous Reports; for that the esteem and safety of such as sit at the Helm of Government, depends not only on Truth, but Fame; For though Praise is not to be sought in the Shambles, yet the good Report of Good Men is to be desired, that they may with a chearful minde, diligently serve and submit both to the pleasure, advantage, and opinion of the Prince in his Government, whose firmeſt Foundations

tions are Justice, Liberality, and Constancy, without which nothing can be Honorable or worthy of Praise.

C H A P. 8.

The Decorum requirable in a Prince; the helps, which may render him and his Kingdom Glorious.

IN every matter be diligent to find out, understand, and defend the Truth, maintain the dignity of your place; do all things with a brave and generous minde, and without Constancy and Equality of temper believe your self beneath a Prince; for this is a Decorum, then which, nothing can be more useful both to your whole Life, and each particular Action.

And certainly it gives great reputation to all mens lives, to carry still the same countenance and forehead, as we read of *Socrates* and *Gajus Lelius*. We finde *Philip* King of *Macedon* in actions of war, and glory to be inferior to his Son, but in clemency and humanity, to
excell

excell him ; and therefore the first was always great , the other often vile ; so that they seem to advise very well , who affirm that the Greater we are, we should be the more humble , considering the Instability of humane things, and changes of Fortune.

Theophrastus deploring the death of his companion * *Calisthenes* , was troubled at the success of

* *Calisthenes* a Philosopher much in favor with *Alexander* , vvhho killed him because he vvould not acknowledge him a God.

Alexander ; for *Calisthenes* was unhappy to be well known

to that Man who was of greatest power, but wholly ignorant how to use his Prosperity.

Much more worthy of praise was that *Cyrus* described by *Xenophon* , not with Historical Truth but as a Pattern for just Empire ; whose extraordinary gravity was mixed with singular clemency, by that Philosopher , whose book , not without good reason, our *Affricanus* was wont always to carry with him , as comprehending all the duties of a wary and moderate Government.

And

And those Republicks, in the Judgment of *Plato* (that Prince of Wit and Learning) were truly happy, which should be governed by learned and wise men, or at least were industrious to advance Wisdom and Learning; for he believed this conjunction of Wisdom and power might conduce greatly to the welfare of the people; which thing perhaps was once the greatest Advancement to our universal Republick, wherein they commonly were raised to the highest commands, whose time and study from their childhood had been spent in the exercise of Principles of Learning, Virtue, and Humanity.

When *Socrates* (in *Gorgias*) was asked by him, if he did not think *Archilaus* (the Son of *Perdiccas*) then very successful, very Happy; replied, I cannot tell, for I never spake with him. What? (replied the other) canst thou know it by no other means? canst thou not say the great King of *Persia* is Happy? *Socrates* returned, How can I, when I know not whether he be a Learned or a Good Man?

C H A P. 9.

Of Moderation in Command of the use of Reason convenient for Princes neglected by barbarous Nations.

PRinces and Magistrates in their Command, ought so to deport themselves towards their Subjects and Allies, as Parents towards their children, or the Soul over the Body; for the Office of the Soul is to make right use of Reason; and as the Minde of a Wise man, so that of a Prince should always be disposed to make the best of his Understanding, which should render him Moderate, Modest, Temperate, Constant, and Continent. We sometimes referre these Epithets to the sole term of Frugality as to their Head, because Virtues seem to be comprehended under that Title through the use of a Proverb, that, *The Frugal man do's all things well.* But, I know, Princes are not to be commended with this attribute, that a King should be a Frugal man, is not much for his Honor;
to

to be Valiant, Just, Severe, Grave, Magnanimous, Munificent, Bountiful, Liberal, are the praises of a Prince, the other of a private Man; let others take it, as they please, I judge Frugality (that is, Modesty and Temperance) to be a very great Virtue, though not so allowed by *Xerxes*, who abounding in the benefits and gifts of Fortune, not content with his great Forces both of Horse and Foot, his multitude of Ships, and infinite Treasure of Gold, proposed a Reward to him who should find out a new Pleasure, which when invented, could not content him; for, Lust is never satisfied, which made *Diogenes* dispute, how much he was Superior to the King of *Persia* in his Life and Fortune; for that he wanted nothing, and the King never had enough. Nor (said he) will I ever desire those pleasures with which he can never be satisfied, and I am sure he can never obtain mine.

We find in Story, that those Barbarous Kings of *Persia* and *Syria* had many Wives, to whom they gave several Cities; to one a City to find the Attire of
her

her Head, to another one for the Ornaments of her Neck, to a third a City for some other Dress, &c. So that the whole people were not only conscious of their Luxury, but servants to supply it.

C H A P. 10.

Of the manners of Princes how they do good or harm by Example:

BY all which it appeareth, how pernicious they are to the Commonwealth who err in this kind, since the Vices which they practise are diffused among the people, although even among them who follow the example, the esteem of Princes is more easily lost, then their life reprov'd; for though we may in this hold them immoderate, yet must we not therefore alledge it, as a Crime. Nay it is the sense of all sober men, and a fixed principle, not only to conceal the faults of Princes, as of our Parents, but patiently to bear them.

Yet it is their part to give Rules of Moderation to themselves, and Laws
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to others ; for if they look back to former times , they may see that as the Inclinations were of the Governors of any City, such was the City ; and the people always followed the change of their Princes manners.

There is therefore much in Example, and most men studiously imitate the Actions of the Prince ; so that his desires and Vices infect his Dominions, and by his Contineny they are corrected and amended. How easie is it to restrain those under your Government, if you contain your self within the bound of grave and constant Discipline ? It is for men Barbarous to live for a Day ; your Counsels should reflect upon Eternity.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

*Of the Preparation of Things Necessary;
Lenity and Continence preserve, Negli-
gence, Cruelty and Avarice destroy both
Prince and People.*

But principally endeavor to avoid (that to which our Ancestors were often necessitated through the want of Treasure and continuance of Wars) the Levying of Taxes; and that this necessity may not fall upon you, make provision long before (for even good men are deaf to the sound of Taxes) and when you attempt any thing, lose no advantage by expectation or delay of time; a short time is long to the unprepared, for a Day or an hour, without Providence, oft produceth great mischief; but a certain time (for the execution of such resolutions is not like that of Sacrifice) to be prefixed.

If necessity shall at any time impose upon you, be careful to make all men understand, they must yield to it for the common safety; and whosoever would be
safe

and Govern well, must have his stores filled with all necessaries for his defence. What those things are, and how to be provided, the nature of the Times, and situation of your Kingdom will make obvious to your reason.

Let it be your Maxim always to incline to Lenity and Equity, that your own people in your troubles may be as willing as able to assist you; for if once their Affections be alienated from you, you will soon find them animated against you.

When I led our Army into *Cilicia*, and the King of *Partha's* Son had past over *Euphrates* with great Forces, I found the affections of our Allies wavering and in suspense, through expectation of Innovation. For their Auxiliaries, through the oppression and injuries of our Governors, were either rendred weak and could not much assist us, or were so alienated from us, that we could neither expect any thing from them, nor trust them.

But in the execution of all publick affairs, even the least suspicion of Ava-

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rice is chiefly to be avoided. I could wish (said *Pontius Samnis*) that I had been born, and Fortune had reserved me for those times, when *Rome* began first to accept Bribes; for I should then soon have stopt their progress to the Empire. He needed not to expect many Ages, for that mischief hath now seized on the Commonwealth, and therefore I could more easily admit *Pontius* to have had that power at that time than now.

No Vice therefore is more destructive to Government, than Avarice in Princes; for to make their power mercenary, is not only Vile, but Impious; and therefore what *Apollo Pythius* gave as Oracular (that *Sparta* could not be ruined by any force but Avarice) seems to be a prediction, not only to the *Lacedemonians*, but to all opulent people; nor can Princes acquire the good-will of their people by any means more easily, than by Continence and abstaining from this Vice.

Such as would preserve the Weal-publick must be far from that kind of Munificence, which takes from some, to be-

bestow on others; for this sort of injurious bounty, the *Lacedemonians* expelled *Lyfander* (one of their *Ephori*) and (which put never before hapned among them) to death *Agis* their King; and from that time, such dissentions followed, that Tyrants started up, extirpated the Nobility, and that so famously constituted Republick fell to ruine; nor did it fall alone, but the Contagion of their miseries diffusing it self, destroyed all *Greece*.

C H A P. 12.

Of Liberality becoming a Prince.

IT is therefore requisite to use such Liberality as may not be hurtful to any, for *Lucius Sylla's*, and *Cajus Casars* translation of Estates from the right Owners to confer them on others, cannot be called Liberality; for nothing is Liberal which is not Just and Moderate.

King *Philip* of *Macedon* notably reprehends his son *Alexander*, for insinuating himself into the affections of the

Macedonians by his excessive bounty. What (a mischief said he) can induce thee to believe, that those will prove Faithful to thee, whom thou corruptest with Money? Do you intend the *Macedonians* should account you not their King but Purf-bearer and Servant. (He said well, that the title of Servant and Purf-bearer did ill become a King, but better, that such a sort of bounty was Corruption) For he is made worse who receives it, and is still more ready to expect it. This to his son, but it may be a precept to All; for it is a great mischief when that which should be effected by Virtue, is attempted by money.

Yet did not *Philip* deal so with Forainers, for he forced open the Gates of Cities, and overthrew Kings (his Emulators) with Bribes; alledging that all Strong Holds might be taken, into which an Als laden with Gold could enter. *Aristotle* gravely and justly reprehends that profusion which is made to captate the multitude with vast loss and infinite cost, especially when neither necessity
re-

requires it, nor Honor is encreased ; nor doth this sort of daubing last long , but so soon as the satisfaction of it is vanished , the memory of the Pleasure dyes with it ; and (as he likewise well collects) this may be grateful to women, children, and servants, but when weighed by sober and serious men , it will never be approved.

The expences on Walls, Ships, Ports, Aquaducts, and such things as tend to Publick benefit , are much more honorable ; as likewise to redeem Captives, and assist necessitous persons, which to have been done frequently by our Order, copiously appears by the Oration of *Grassus*. I therefore prefer this Custom of Bounty before that profusion of Donatives : This becomes great and wise men, that flatterers of the people, and such as caress the Levity of the multitude with pleasures, but you must not always be alike affected in different occasions ; for his case who is oppressed by calamity , differs from anothers who seeks your bounty, not urged by necessity. Let your Liberality incline more to

those in distress, unless they appear to deserve their misery.

Cyrus is worthy your imitation, who bestowed honors and rewards on such as designed things great and honorable, by which he raised an ardor of Glory in the minds of All, every man being studious and industrious to excell in such things as the Prince approved.

To excel in this kind of Liberality is Kingly, though not to be admired in *Cyrus* for that he was very wealthy, but that in these Offices the Prince should contend with the subject with so much honor and civility was no small wonder to *Xenophon*. But this he practised from his Grandfathers Discipline and advice, that neither his Treasure should be exhausted by extravagant gifts, nor incitements to Virtue and Obedience be wanting, because it is not an easie thing to be always giving; neither would he that the Honors which the King conferred (as Bracelets, Collars, and Bridles of Gold, which among the *Persians* none could wear, but such as received them from the King) should be made common.

It

It certainly mainly concerns you to preserve the Rewards of Virtue and service, Sacred and un sullied; not to be conferred on Vitious and loose Persons, or made cheap by men of mean deservings; for men will be less studious of Virtue when the Rewards of it are debased, and such as have received Honor for their brave Actions when they see unworthy men alike honored, think themselves lessned.

Keep always a Memory and esteem of good services; nor at any time discover in your self either a want of will, or not to have the Power to reward, for you ought not only to have a value for the well-deserving, but not to suffer them to be necessitated to sue for their recompence, difficulty in that kind being inexcusable; nor is it just to confine the memory of a benefit to a time or a day, or to defer the acknowledgment, but rather hasten it, lest you lose the fruit of your Bounty and the thanks; and this is chiefly to be observed, if you are to bestow any thing on the less importunate and modest persons; for it is

grievous to a modest man to be put to importune him of whom he hath well deserved, lest he may rather seem to exact then desire it, as the Hire rather, not the Reward of his service.

If those who have well merited, are of that Quality, that their Memory should be transmitted to posterity, to such you must not be ingrateful; for all mankind detest those who forget benefits received, and you will have use not only of the esteem and judgments of men now alive, but of those who shall come after, although their judgments will be more sincere, as free from malice and detraction.

Be courteous, not only to those who may seem to deserve it, but to others, that All, according to their quality may have respect.

Give no countenance to men too covetous of Mony or Honors, and immoderate in their desires, which no prey, unjustly gotten, can allay, but rather augment and inflame; so that they should rather be punished then admonished.

CHAP,

C H A P. 13.

Of Reward and Punishment.

S*olon*, who of all the seven was the wisest, and the only Writer of Laws, affirmed the Commonwealth to be contained only in two things, *viz.* in Reward and Punishment; of both which (as of other things) there ought to be a Measure and Mediocrity. Be not too liberal (not to say Prodigal) in conferring Honors, nor too severe in correction or punishment; but I hold it dangerous to omit the punishment of a wicked Act, lest it give encouragement to the imitation of the like Folly; neither is clemency and mercy otherwise to be approved then that severity for the common good may take place, without which Government cannot subsist; for a salutary severity, excelleth the empty shew of Clemency.

But in this (as in other things) it is to be wished that Princes (like their Laws) would be induced to punish not with Anger,

Anger, but Equity, and prefer to any Private, the Publick safety.

C H A P. 14.

Of the Princes Prudence to be moderated by consideration of Times, Things and Persons, of which are laid down several Rules and Cautions.

TO all Arts we are to add that, which we call common Prudence, of which every man who is to govern any design is to have his share. In a Prince is requisite the knowledge of opportunities proper for Action, for all affairs are managed by Authority, Judgment, and Counsel, which is to be taken from the Matter, Person, and Time, and to be governed (like a Ship in its steerage and course) after the condition of the Commonwealth, since you are not always to adhere to the same Opinion and Reason, but such as the State of Things, Inclination of the Times, and Rule of Concord will admit. In great Commotions, Revolution of Affairs and Trouble,

ble, yield rather to the Times then Customes; yet still have an eye to the main end, *viz.* Religion and the safety of the people.

This is *Plato's* Rule (whom, I confess, I zealously follow) Contend for so much in the Republick as may be justified to your Countymen; for you must not impose violently either on your Parents or your Country, and this he professeth to be the cause why he would never be concerned in the Commonwealth; for finding the *Athenian* State almost doating on their long continuance, he perceived they would neither be perswaded, nor compelled to any better Rule of Government; and when they could not be perswaded, he did not conceive it Just they should be compelled. —

By this you may perceive the Power of Times, the great Variety of Things, how incertain their events, and how flexible the will of men; ponder therefore with your self the snares and Vanities incident to Life.

Cato, though of excellent inclinations and greatest integrity, did sometimes

times hurt the Commonwealth ; for he always gave his Opinion , not as in the corrupt constitution of *Romulus* , but in the polite Commonwealth of *Plato*, and pleading too pertinaciously, for the (too parcimonious) expence and Institutions of our Ancestors, alienated the Equestrian Order, and the most eminent persons from the Senate.

It is the duty of every Senator, to endeavor (as much as in him lies) that no eminent or powerful person be displeased with the Prince or his Counsel ; and though he be an enemy in the highest degree to any particular man, yet this ought to be observed for the common good.

Concerning Priviledges and Honors it is mainly to be considered, that they be not injuriously impaired ; it hath been ruinous to many , who have disgusted such as have been eminent in Wisdom, Power, or Military Virtue. For it is more grievous to be divested of Honors , then not to be advanced in dignity , and the sting of lost liberty wounds deeper then perpetual servitude. A man unacquainted

ted with contumely, a stranger to disgrace, bold in Fight, can hardly compose the tempest of his thoughts 'twixt grief and anger, when fallen from an high condition.

Never leave a man eminent for Wisdom, Counsel, or favor nor a powerful Nobleman (though a Fool) to be wrought upon by desperate men. *Cæsar* while *Pompey* endeavored to lessen his esteem, ran into extremes, and with a violent heat of Youth destroyed the Dignity of our ancient Republick and Empire.

All changes of things of Moment are most easily and commodiously accomplished if the Times conspire, otherwise they are to be effected gently and by degrees, as friendships (which when less delightful and satisfactory) in the opinion of wise men are to be relinquished rather by degrees then suddenly dissolved.

In all Fortunes adhere to what is just and honest; nothing ought to be done, given, or taken away from any person which may be of example or advantage to ill-meaning men.

Never

Never confer any thing on powerful men which may render them aspiring or arrogant. The Senate decreed many great, and almost peculiar Honors to *C. Caesar* (as a Province (out of his Order, supplications in number such) as never to any man in any war; an honor peculiar to him; a Prorogation of his command for five years, to shew their esteem of him in his absence; with these things he so much advantaged himself, that he kept both his Army and Province in despite of the Senate, whom he hated for that advantage; his desire was to be King of the *Roman* people and Lord of all Nations which he effected; but the Original of all this was, that he was not resisted when weak (which was then easie) *Pompey* began to fear *Caesar*, too late, and I wish rather that he had never given him so great strength, then that he should have afterwards opposed him when so strong.

Proportion your Trust to the Fidelity of the persons, but give command only to such whom you can willingly affect when they have done well, or
most

most easily punish when they neglect their duty.

A man of a private condition raised to great Fortune and power, can scarce contain himself within the bounds of his duty; as neither one born and educated in an eminent Estate, always accustomed to applause and glory. This was evident in that Scholar of *Aristotle* of great Wit, and as great Modesty, till he was saluted King; but then, proud, cruel, and immoderate; next to him that companion of *Quirinus*, who by error of Opinion, phancied to himself the Sovereignty: When *Pompey* had given into his hands, all his own and the *Roman* Peoples strength with their Forces. He oppressed both *Pompey* and the *Roman* People, and compelled a City, not only Free, but Commandress of the whole World to serve him; but we were little careful of the Commonwealth, when we granted to any one greater strength and power then our Liberty could bear.

Trust nothing in his hands who turns all to his own profit, or wants prudence in Counsel; give no credit, nor commit

mit any part of your reputation to one, whom you have once found criminal; for no wise man, yet, thought a Traitor worthy of Trust.

That error reproved by that common Proverb, *Twice to the same*, is very dangerous in a State; whosoever calls to minde our miseries, will never use the Counsel of a treacherous or malicious person, or trust a Coward.

Reject not any man to whom a thing hapneth, which may sometimes befall the wisest and best men, desirous enough to serve the Publick; while it appears he is honest, though he rather followed dangerous then safe Advice which may be lyable to reprehension.

Take no Security for a Person, by whom your own or the safety of the State may be endangered; for the obligation for another mans Inclinations or Judgment, is more weighty and difficult, then that of mony, for that may be discharged, and it is only a probable loss of an Estate; but how can any man make good his obligation to you, or the State, unless the person for whom he stood bound,

bound, will suffer himself to be secured.

Be always so careful of your self, as not to be in the power of those whom you may suspect, but they rather in yours.

Let your ears give a Value to Truth, and not be open to whisperers and flatterers for advantage.

Gain gotten by calumny, by reason of the mischiefs it brings upon the innocent is of all the most vile, and worthy severest punishment.

Those Pests of mankind, who envy the glory, and good of other men, are of all to be abhorred and suppressed, who very often alienate Princes from their best subjects, and change their affection to the Prince. These *Agefilas*

* hated more than Thieves, for that he held it worse to be deprived of his friends, then robbed of his goods. It is therefore a felicity

rials of their Virtues and good Actions.

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* *Agefilas* was King of *Lacedemon* famous for his valour, wisdom, and modesty, which was such as he would not suffer any picture or statue to be made of his person, saying, that Princes ought to have no other Monuments but Memorials of their Virtues and good Actions.

(to a Prince) when the truth is discovered, and the suppressed defence of Innocence respires, which is commonly done when those skilled in this base art will not so much dare openly to attempt as design, and those of a more desperate Audacity, are left to their own precipitate Counsels.

Credulity is rather an Error than a crime, and may easily insinuate into the minds of the best men, yet is it very dangerous in a State.

Therefore that your Government may not suffer by credulity, adhere to this Maxim of *Epicharmus*. The Nerves and Joints of Wisdom are, Not to believe rashly; and let it be your Elogium. Not to be capable of being easily deceived or overcome.

C H A P. 15.

Of the Princes, Seal, Senate, Senators, and Counsel.

L Et not your Seal be as your Instrument but as your self, not the Minister

nister of anothers will, but as a witness of your own.

Let your Senate be like that of *Areopagus* ; * Constant ,

Severe , Grave and

Stout ; your Sena-

tor do all things

which become a

person of his condi-

tion , and not only

those things which

are every particular

mans duty , viz.

to be Faithful and Vigilant , a Lo-

ver of his Country , &c. but when he

gives his Opinion to be (as one most

eminent in the Commonwealth) Pru-

dent also. For when I assumed my part

in the Government of my Country , I

thought my self equally worthy of Re-

proof , when I gave in the Senate unpro-

fitable , as when unfaithful Advice ; nei-

ther did I believe my self to be excused ,

if when the Publick was to be defended ,

I sought upon pretence of great Affairs ,

my own quiet , or resolved not to come

into the Senate till better Times ; for

* A place very famous in *Athens* by the Temple of *Mars* , vvhhere the Judges instituted by *Solon* , sate in the night , and vvhere not to see the Persons that pleaded their causes before them , but only heard the voices , and gave judgment vvith exact severity.

no pretence of Rest or Fear ought to hinder your Duty or Fidelity to your Country.

Take Counsel of the most Faithful and Wise, and confer on such Authority, nor suffer them to be slighted; if any shall presume to that insolence, think your self to be Affronted in their injury and your Authority to be despised. All things of this nature are to be suppressed, as pernicious in their example and progress; for this mischief groweth on by degrees of Custom, and riseth to a sudden height by presumption, and when the punishment is laid aside, liberty takes place.

It will be of no little benefit to take those into your Cabinet, whose Fidelity and Experience in Affairs, you have known to excel others, with whom you may freely communicate and examine all events of past and future Actions, and according to their weight what is to be suspended, what put in execution; by these means you will have time to discern Truth from Falshood, and consider
what

what is best to be done, and so publish nothing but what hath been maturely weighed, and consulted by them, to your great honor and advantage.

C H A P. 16.

To avoid Flatterers.

Make it your care never to let your Ears be open to Flatterers; it was *Pompey's* error, who, though he saw all our dangers involved with his own, adhered to the Counsels of certain inexperienced and imprudent men.

Do nothing that may create opinion that you hate Truth, or will exercise your displeasure and malice on such as advise Honestly; for this is poison to faithful Counsellors, nourisheth and invites the wicked and perfidious, gives temptation to obsequious Humor, which indulging to error, precipitates many into Ruine.

But the greatest Mischief to such as despise Truth, and are drawn into snares

by compliance, is, that they are most commonly apt to flatter themselves and most delighted with it. Virtue indeed is a Lover of her self, and as she is Amiable, so she knows best and understands her self. But I speak not here of Virtue, but of the Opinion of Virtue; for many men would rather seem Virtuous, then be really endued with Virtue, and these are pleased with Flattery, and a speech composed to their inclinations, makes them believe that vain Oratory to be a real testimony of their Worth; this therefore is rather pernicious then dutiful, when the one is neither willing to hear Truth, nor the other prepared to speak it.

But this is certain, when a Princes Ears are so shut up against Truth, that they cannot hear it, his ruine is hardly to be avoided.

CHAP.

C H A P. 17.

Of preserving Authority and avoiding evil desires which diminish it.

L Et your deportment be constant and Grave, which not only resists Flattery, but removes the suspicion.

For you are to imitate a wise Judge, who avoids offence by the Equity of his Decrees, and acquires the good will of all men by his patience in hearing, and care to give just satisfaction. Briefly, be so circumspect both in your life and Government, that there remain not the least suspicion of Sloth or Levity; commit no Act may make you seem Timorous or Effeminate.

If any thing happen worthy of your Fear, dissemble it; use present courage and Counsel, and quit not your Reason. This was a Maxim frequently practised in our Republick, most eminently in the second Punick War; when after the misfortune at *Cannæ*, they assumed greater Courage then before that

Victory of the enemy ; no signs of Fear, no mention of Peace, for it is dishonorable in a Prince to submit his Courage to any danger.

As in the steps of a Ladder, if you take away some, cut other, and leave the rest, ill put together, you prepare an instrument to fall down and not to ascend ; so in the distresses of the Commonwealth, if you desert her, when disjoyned, nor shew your self Active to confirm your peoples safety, and resolve to remove the danger, you will be so far from recovering what is lost, as you accelerate a total ruine.

Be careful in all things that may be foreseen by Counsel, and when there is an error of Judgment, amend it by your diligence. I saw *Pompey* on the 14 of the Calends of *Febr.* full of fear ; on that day I foresaw his ruine, after that he never pleased me, but perpetually committed errors ; he neither had Courage nor Counsel, Forces nor Conduct. Not to mention that base Flight from the Citie, timorous Orations to the people, ignorance not only of his Adversaries, but
of

of his own Forces; to be short, he had nothing good left to him but the Cause, which was that only wanting on *Cæsars* side, who excelled in all other things, as vigilancy, expedition, diligence, of which had our General made use, we had recovered the Commonwealth.

As (if placed in this degree of Honor) I would not be of a low dejected spirit in adversity; so neither would I want the common sense of Nature. For this hardness of the minde is (like that of the Body, which when burn'd, grows insensible) rather stupidity then courage or Magnanimity. A Prince must flie that error of throwing and offering himself to danger without cause, then which nothing is more foolish; he should endeavor to acquire glory in his death, and not leave behinde him the blame of a fault and the dishonor of folly.

Very commendable was the prudence of * *Plancus*, who

* See the 6 Chapter.

would not fall by such rashness; for when the two Armies were joined, to hazard most faithful Legions (against them) our best Auxiliaries,

ries, the Princes of *Gallia*, the whole Province: he concluded was highest madness and temerity; and that if by his overthrow he should destroy the Commonwealth, he should not only deprive himself of all honor, when dead, but of all compassion.

Good men lamented the death of
 * *Trebonius*, yet were there some (severe indeed they were) that said, he was the less to be pittied for that he did not secure himself against a wicked and vitious man.

C H A P. 18.

What things a Prince ought always to have in readinesſ to defend both himſelf and his Authority.

IT is the opinion of wiſe men, That whoſoever undertakes the protection of many, ought firſt to provide for his own

own safety, which by my advice King *Ariobarzanes* observed.

For when by the Authority of the Senate I was enjoined to have a care of the safety and preservation of that * King, with this ad-

ded, that his welfare was of great concern to the people and

* King of *Cappadocia*, whose father was murdered by his subjects.

Senate (which was never before decreed by our order concerning a King) I carried the Senates Decree to him, and discovering the conspiracies, which I understood to be on foot against his life and Authority; I advised him to use all diligence to preserve himself, and withall encouraged those who were tryed friends to his Father, whose sad misfortune, was a Document to them, to defend him with all their strength and care; and I gave him this Rule, that he should begin to govern by securing his own life and power, such as he found engaged in designs against him, on them to exercise the Authority of a King, to punish some when he saw a necessity, and to free the rest from the fear of it; that

that he should make use of the Force of my Army rather to terrifie, then contend with the guilty, and by these means I freed him from those conspiracies, and so not only rendred him safe, but provided that he should reign with Authority.

The safety of the Prince is the peoples safety, and commonly on his single life depends the preservation of All.

Nothing therefore is more necessary, then to have good stores of Armes, by which you may secure your self, defie the insolent, and be revenged when provoked; as likewise to have ships in your harbors, to secure your Coasts in the Provinces. These Naval preparations by the advice of *Themistocles*, were never to be omitted, for who is Master of the Sea, is ever thought to be the greatest Prince.

And in my opinion in Islands and Provinces lying on the Sea, where good Harbors are, there ought to be a particular care of Navigation, not only for the common safety, but the honor of the Kingdom. This was Reason and greatness.

ness of minde in our Ancestors, who content with little in their domestick affairs and expences, living very frugally, converted all to the glory, splendor, and dignity of the Empire; for in private affairs, frugalitie; in publick, magnificence is to be preferred and commended.

C H A P. 19.

Idleness to be suppressed that all may be useful to the Publick, none to be Turbulent.

IF in any place your Country be uninhabited and incultivate, make there your plantations, that the Sinks of your Provinces and Cities may be emptied, and the Desarts frequented, but without injury to the ancient Proprietors; that you may not seem to have removed the one, or dispossessed the other, but to have constituted both. Consider all things that may invite mens minds from idleness to honest and profitable Arts,
study

study and industry, which may be several waies effected; especially (as if at publick Games) you propose a Prize to those who excel. For whatsoever is rare and excellent, seems to men pleasant and desirable for its reward.

Discipline hath great influence on the people; the Laws of *Crete* and those of *Lycurgus*, educated their youth in labors, as in Hunting, Running, &c. to indure Hunger, Thirst, Cold and Heat. For those who gave the Rules of publick affairs in *Greece* would have the Bodies of the Youth strengthened by labor, which the *Spartans* imposed even on their Women, who in other Cities in a most soft manner lay idle, within the shadow of their Walls, but nothing like this was permitted to the *Lacedemonian* Virgins, who were rather pleased with wrestling, swimming, heats, dust, labor, and war, then a Barbarous and unprofitable fertility.

This Nation, while *Lycurgus* his Laws were in force, were a valiant people. One of whom, when *Perses* their enemy boastingly told them that they should
not

not see the Sun, for the multitude of his Arrows, replied, We shall then fight in the shade. In this I only mention their men; but what was that woman, who informed, that her Son was slain in battle, replied, I therefore brought him forth, that he might not fear to die for his Country.

Such, so valiant, and hardy were the *Spartans*, and such once the *Romans*.

* our Armies taking their Name from their harbor, when every man would carry

** Exercitus* from their exercise of constant Discipline and labor.

half a months provision with any thing for use, as Stakes, Palisadoes, &c. For his Target, Sword, and Head-piece, was not accounted as a Burden, no more then Shoulders, Armes, or Hands. For weapons are the Members of a Souldier, which are to be so conveniently carried, as throwing away all other burden, they may use them as readily as their Limbs. But what is now the practice of our Legions? Why such a difference between our old and new Troops? They are perhaps listed at a better Age, but custom of
hard-

hardship, service, and contempt of danger, must with a brave desire of honor, render them valiant and famous.

Those labors which are signalized by Honor and Renown, seem alwaies easie. And this is a light which all men follow who seek glory ; and therefore *Scipio Africanus* alwaies carried *Socratick Xenophon* about him, particularly commending this his Maxim, That no labor was so burdensom to a General, as to a Souldier, for that Honor made it less tedious to a General.

The books of *Xenophon* are very useful for many things, and therefore I advise you to read them studiously, not omitting that of Husbandry, which he terms *Oeconomick* ; and that you may understand how much he believes the Study of Agriculture becomes a Prince, *Socrates* in that book is introduced discoursing with *Cristobulus*, That *Cyrus* (the less) King of *Persia*, of an excellent wit, and glorious in his Empire, when *Lysander* the *Lacedemonian*, a person of great Virtue came to him at *Sardis*, and brought him presents from his Allies,
being

being many ways civil to *Lysander*, he shewed him a Piece of Ground exquisitely planted; and when *Lysander* admiring the streightness of the Trees, their order and exact distance, the Earth good and well levelled with the sweet odour of the Flowers, told him he could not but admire his care and diligence, who had measured and designed them; *Cyrus* replied, that all that design and order was his own work; for most of those Trees had been set and planted by his own hand, whereupon *Lysander* gazing on his glorious Habit, enriched with Gold and Gemmes (after the *Persian* manner) answered, The world (*O Cyrus*) doth justly call thee happy, since this Good Fortune, is added to thy Vertue.

C H A P. 20.

*Of the Virtues which gain mens Affections
and Vices which alienate them from
Princes.*

ENdeavor to free your self from all
passion and perturbation so, that
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by tranquillity you may with an equal Temper keep your Dignity; for nothing more becomes a Great man, then Gentleness and Clemency.

It is hard to express how much Humanity and Affability gains on mens affections; there are extant *Philips* Epistles to *Alexander*, *Antipaters* to *Cassander*, and those of *Antigonus* to *Philip* (three of the most prudent, we read of in *Greece*) wherein they advise to work upon the minds of the multitude by courteous and civil language, and speaking kindly to the souldiery.

And this ought to be your practice, if you will remember how considerable a thing it is to preserve in Publick the Person of a Prince, which must not only satisfy the minds, but the eyes and ears of his subjects, That his Nature may not seem harsh, his Access difficult, his countenance severe, his answers insolent, and his deportment proud.

Keep up the greatness of your minde with Gentleness and civility; and if your passion be moved by such as intrude into your presence, unseasonably, or petition
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impudently, suffer not your self to be transported into an odious and useles Morosity, and at length to be perswaded into better humor, through the Artifice of recovering your good Temper by such as never read of *Xenophons Cyrus*, or *Agesslaus*; from which Kings, no man ever heard an harsh word; contrary to the practice of other barbarous Princes, who give their commands thus, Observe and obey my Orders, and if you ask a question, return these Threats, If I see you here again you die for it, which things as they are abhorred in the very reading, so much more in the Practice.

Avoid all sudden Passion, ill Language and contumely, which as they are abhorrent from common civility, so are they altogether disagreeable to the dignity and power of a Prince; for if your Anger be implacable, it degenerates into cruelty, if you quickly relent, it's accounted Levity, which notwithstanding is to be preferred to the other. What can appear more ugly then *Homers Achilles*, or *Agamemnons* quarrels? For *Ajax*

his Fury, led him speedily to madness and death; but when *Alexander* had killed his friend *Clytus*, he could hardly hold his hands from violence on himself, so great is the power of Repenting a rash Act.

Nothing appears so ugly as cruelty joyned with power, neither doth any thing more incense or scandalize the minds of men, then when Revenge is equalled to injuries; for dishonor hath a kinde of sting, which modest and good men can ill endure, much less the Factious and Insolent, of a proud and mutable disposition.

C H A P. 21.

Of the Charge, Duties and Studies of a Prince, and wherein they consist.

ALL Governors ought to observe two precepts given by *Plato*. First so to be careful of the Publick benefit, that all their Actions may have respect to that, without thought of their own
com-

commodity. Next that they so consider the whole body of the Kingdom, as not to protect one part and neglect the rest. For while they consult for the benefit of one party, and regard not the other, Discord (which is destruction to both) ensueth. Hence springeth not only sedition, but the Plague of Civil War, which a wise and worthy Prince will flie and detest, and wholly apply himself to the good of all. His first care will be to preserve every one in his right by Law, Justice, not to suffer those of a low condition (for that reason) to be oppressed; nor with envy to disturb the rich in the possession of their wealth. To me it seems most reasonable, that such as are in Authority, should endeavor to make all happy who are under their command, to suppress seditions, discords, oppressions and murders; to remove that cruel Minister of Avarice and Ambition, Calumny from the Fame, Fortune, and Quiet of the Wealthy. To be careful that Taxes and publick Contributions be equally born. To provide that the Publick suffer not by debts.

To be easie of Access , and ready to hear all Complaints. Not to suffer that any mans Poverty or want of Friends should exclude him , not only from a Publick but private Address ; and lastly that in the whole Kingdom nothing seem cruel or grievous , but all full of clemency, mildeness, and humanity.

Make this your Rule, that wheresoever you come men may believe that light and happiness appears with you. Nor let this be your sole Act , but see it be done by all your Ministers and Attendants , for what can be more to your Honor, or more desirable, then not to see the people terrified in your Progress, exhausted by your expence, or troubled at your presence, but rather a Publick and Private Joy wheresoever you come , and when every Town seems to entertain a Guardian, not a Tyrant; not an Oppressor, but a welcome Guest.

C H A P. 22.

Certain things whence the Ruine or Safty of a Prince proceeds, and on which it depends.

Nothing contributes more to the establishment and preservation of a King, then to be beloved; nothing more to his destruction, then to be feared, as *Ennius* said very well, whom men fear they hate, and whom they hate they desire to destroy; but an universal hatred no power can resist, a *Maxime* lately made manifest, if not formerly known.

Fear is a very ill maintainer of continuance, but goodwill a faithful guard to perpetuity: And how happy they are that desire to be feared, *Dionysius* the Tyrant is a famous example, for when one of his Flatterers in discourse, cryed up the strength, power, and Majesty of his Kingdom; the abundance of his wealth, and Magnificence of his Palaces, denying any man to have been more hap-

py. Wilt thou then *Damocles* (said he) since this sort of life is so pleasing to thee, once taste it & try my Fortune? To which *Damocles* assenting, he was placed in a rich Chair of State, upon the most costly and magnificent Carpets, and many Cupboards filled with the statliest and richest Gold and Silver Plate, and round the Table Boys of the choicest Beauty commanded to wait, and diligently to observe his Nod; nor were there wanting Crowns, richest Unguents and sweetest Odours, with all variety of dainties on the Table. *Damocles* hitherto thinking himself very happy, till looking upward he saw a bright sword let down from the Ceiling, and hanging only by a horses hair directly over his head, so that terrified with this apparition, he neither looked more on his beautiful Attendants, nor the furniture and Plate; nor moved his hand towards the Table, and now even his Crown was too heavy, till at length he begged of the Tyrant that he might be released, for that he had no desire, now, to be happy. By this it appears that *Dionysius*

nysius thought no man happy, who had any thing of terror hanging over him; nor was it at all safe for him to return to Justice and restore their Laws and liberty to his people; for he so far entangled himself in errors in his youth, that he could never be secure if once he began to be sober; in his latter time he wanted all necessaries, lived with Fugitives and barbarous people, believed no man to be his friend, who was either worthy of liberty or did affect it, but feared all; for such as desire to be feared, must of necessity fear those to whom they are a terror; neither can any power of Empire be so great, as to be durable, when surrounded with fear; of this we our selves are presidents, who having oppressed and ruined Forain Nations, were invaded by Civil Wars, by which the Walls only of our City are left standing, and even those in apprehension of extreamest mischief; but having almost lost the name of a Republick, we fell into these miseries, while we chose rather to be feared than to be desired or beloved.

But

But nothing confers more to establishment, then to provide that the Dignity of the Prince may not be violated, or his Authority brought into common hatred ; for the very name of Empire is of great weight, and in light persons is a terror ; for that being put into command they abuse their Masters name, and mix their sordidness with the splendor of the Prince.

Let the person whom you place in Authority, be a Minister, not of his own but your Clemency, and let him always carry his Axes and Rods as greater Ensigns of his Dignity then Power. Make it appear to your whole Kingdom , that the common Safty, their Children, Honor, and Fortune are dearest to you.

Lastly take this as a Maxim, That not only those who receive any thing basely, but such as give it shall be odious to you when it comes to your knowledge ; for then no man will receive or give a Bribe , when it is known that the Ministers of a Prince , and the Magistrates are so concern'd for their Reputation ; and that this Law cannot be infringed,

fringed, *viz.* Let them do no injury, take nor give Bribes either in seeking, executing, or laying down an employment; neither suffer that Authority, which you have given as an Honor, or an Office, conferred as a Benefit or a Charge, as a Recompence of former services to be abused by unlawful gains. Be likewise careful not to permit any thing injurious, or of a sordid nature to be imputed from you by such as pretend to have power about you; but this is not offered as an Advice that you should be harsh to your servants or suspicious; but cautious in believing, and diligent in observing what they possess, be honestly gotten without the imputation of odious or dishonest gain, and let them rather make use of your Liberality than their own Liberty. Neither is it advised (since these inclinations now tend only to too much levity, and less dangerous ambition) that you should be too scrupulous into all miscarriages, and so suddenly shake off every man, but to trust nothing to such as follow all ways of money, and do all things for monies sake.

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The *Pragmatici*, in all their Histories, Precepts, and even Verses, advise to be cautious, and forbid to be credulous; but when a man hath performed any thing handsomly and well, to reward, and trust him.

C H A P. 23.

Four Guards by which the Prince and his Authority should be secured.

THink nothing more your interest then to have near you, a list of such persons as excel in any Art or Science; to know their qualities and studies, and excite and invite them to your own and your peoples benefit, by advancing to honors and employments, men of your own choice, and obliged to you alone, from whom those rewards ought to proceed, that you may have them every where watchful for you, placed as Guards to secure you from all mischief.

2. To preserve your self Quiet in your Government, it should be your Principal

pal care that not only those who are raised to Honors, Command, and Power, but such as have the Government of your Forts and Garrisons, should wholly and immediately depend on you; and let this be a Maxim in State, to meet all occasions, and break all hopes (of Insurrection) for prevention of their Ambition, who either design or aspire to violent power or Force.

3. By taking Progress at certain times about your Provinces, you may suppress injuries, insolencies, wicked designs, and give timely relief to those parts of your Empire, which are prompt to lapse into distempers, by which you may make your Remedy stronger then the Disease; for those parts which are remotest from the Princes eye, are to be governed with greater care, secured with stronger Guards, and looked into with clearer lights, because all things may fall into change, before they can (by reason of distance) be well heard. But in the seat of the Empire, in view of the Prince nothing can subsist which may not be extinguished and suppressed soon as it
springs

springs up or appears ; nor can the great ones and prime Ministers so easily violate their inferiors, or spoil the wealthy , as in remoter Provinces , where commonly such as are oppressed are in that condition , that they cannot so much complain of their Grievances.

4. In the mean time since the people hold all their Benefits, Rights and Safety by the Laws, be so just and careful, as not to recede from them. For all things should be governed and administred by Law, as by the soul (of a Kingdom.) For as our bodies cannot subsist without a soul ; so without Laws a Kingdom can make no use of its parts, nerves, blood, and Members.

CHAP.

C H A P. 24.

Of Prudence in extreme affairs ; several cautions concerning Forainers.

1. **B**ut you are not wholly to apply your self to Domestick Affairs; the State, Inclinations, Force, Leagues, Contracts and Counsels of Forainers, are likewise to be considered.

2. Be chiefly circumspect, that none about you be corrupted by them, betray their Trust and your Counsel to them.

3. That no impressions of Disaffection towards you be made in your Allies.

4. That their Forces raised upon other pretences, be not suddenly turned against you.

5. It will much confer to your Grandeur to understand what esteem other Kings or Nations, your enemies or Allies have of your Person, Government, State and Power. For that in matters of that high nature, men either despise or fear, hate or love, and are moved no less

less by opinion of Fame, then by certain reason.

6. Keep a strict Amity with such as either by ancient friendship, good offices, dangers, or leagues have been allied to you.

7. Be Just, not only to these, but to others; suffer not your people to do any rude, barbarous, or injurious Act to Forainers, lest something should be done contrary to the Laws of Nations.

8. Leave what belongs to Dogs, to fawn on Domestickes, and bark at Strangers.

9. They are very unadvised, who exclude Forainers from their Cities, for it injures the common Society of mankind.

10. By no means admit those (to familiarity) who come as spies, or otherwise decline their duty, which is only to follow their own private affairs, or to be little curious in another Commonwealth.

11. As little as may be, mix not your interest with the quarrels of your neighbors,

bors, but consult for the Peace of your Successors.

12. Trouble not the Foundation of their *Quiet*, lest you raise in them desires to seek your Ruine and destroy your friends. For those things which perhaps we little apprehend to be of consequence; as that in peace we make use of the most wealthy Citizens (that they have neighboring and remote, fruitful plantations, to which they can make easie voyages, wherein they chearfully follow their business, whence they return partly with supplies of Merchandize and honest gain; partly with other negotiations of settling their Seats and Families) are of no small Advantage to the Prince and people, to have so considerable numbers of their Country to be employed abroad in so honest and beneficial affairs.

13. If any offence be given by your Subjects, whether through the ignorance or perverseness of Allies, shew all readiness to expiate the injury, and Religiously observe on your part, all that relates to you.

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14. Be

14. Be careful to keep the Seas free from Pirats, and safe for Navigation.

15. The Forts and Garrisons of your Kingdom always in good condition,

16. Your Navy in good order.

17. Preserve your Merchants and Husbandmen, not only from Oppression, but even from the fear of it.

18. For in other things when any calamity happens, there is (indeed) a loss received, but in Husbandry and Imposts not only what mischief happens, but even the apprehension of it, brings calamity. For when the enemies forces are not far off, though they make no irruption, yet they leave their Cattle, quit their Tillage, all Traffick ceaseth, and by the sole rumor of danger, and fear of a War, a whole years profit is lost.

19. Never suffer Forainers to abuse your Merchants, whose Estates and Fortunes should be in your strictest care to preserve. For the destruction of a number of Citizens cannot be separate from the whole Republick; for when in a City, Province, or Kingdom, many suffer

suffer in their Estates, and Fortunes, they must of necessity draw with them many more into the same misfortune.

20. From this danger the Commonwealth is to be secur'd, and you are to use all study and industry, by which your own and your Kingdoms honor, the safety of your subjects, with the Commonwealth, may be preserved, defended and augmented.

21. Add to this, that nothing more becomes a Prince, nothing more generous, nothing more munificent then to aide the oppressed, to restore them to safety, and free them from danger (though I confess it a difficult part to assume the care of other mens concerns) it being not only very profitable, but may be (if you expect any thing of advantage) the means to obtain it.

22. Let nothing seem too much in time of danger; but it is not then to be cautious in words. For most men are more apt to fear then to be mindful of their duty, and I know not whether they appear not more easily kind in their fear, then grateful after Victory.

23. If according to League, aid is to be desired, their Defence and your Duty in that particular must not be omitted, for Leagues are things Sacred, and a Kingdoms chief support is its honor and the kindness of its Allies; upon which Maxim (not provoked by any injurie to themselves) our Ancestors made war against *Antiochus*, *Philip*, the *Etolians* and *Carthaginians* for their Allies. Nothing therefore can be a greater blemish to your Honor, then when you (who have the esteem of being able to defend, even those who are almost strangers to your Friendship) shall not be capable to assist your Confederates.

24. If your necessities force you to seek aid from Allies, let it not appear that your people are to be secured, rather by the benefit of their Aid, then your own Valour and Power.

25. Beware lest among other mischiefs, either Auxiliary Soldiers or your enemies think your troubles to be their opportunitie, as the *Roman* people pretending the defence of their Allies, possessed themselves of all their lands, and
when

when Conquerors gave and took from Kings and Confederates what they pleased.

26. A Prince ought chiefly to look to the conservation of the Rules of War; for since there are two kinds of contention, one by Dispute (in Treaty) and another by Force; and the first proper to Mankind, the last likewise common to Beasts; if you cannot make right use of the first, you must have recourse to the second.

27. Wherefore War is to be undertaken to the end you may live in Peace, and after Victory such are to be preserved, as have not been cruel or barbarous in the War; and you are not only to provide for those whom you have conquered by force; but likewise for those who laying down Arms, flie to your Mercy, even when you have stormed their Walls. In which procedure, so exactly did our Ancestors observe the Rules of Justice, that whatsoever Conquered City or Nation they had received into their Protection, they were afterward the constant Patrons of them; the equity

of war was most religiously observed by the * *Fecial Law*, by

* The Law which Authorized Heralds to pass as persons not to be violated, between Armies and Countries to denounce War, or offer peace, always held inviolable and Sacred by all Nations.

which it may be understood, that no war was just, but that which was enterprized for reparation of injuries, and first denounced or

proclaimed.

28. But let war be so undertaken as that nothing but peace may seem first to be desired; every Prince ought to defend his subjects.

29. Our Ancestors levyed war, either when their Merchants were retained or abused. Our Embassadors insolently received at *Corinth* (the light of all *Greece*) would have had it extinguished. For that they esteemed the Embassadors to represent the Senate, and Authoritie of the *Roman* people, and their right not only to be forfeited by strength of men, but guarded by divine Law.

30. But in the subversion and demolition of Cities great care ought to be taken, that nothing be done cruelly or rashly,

rashly, unless perhaps against such as seem void of all Humanity, as the *Carthaginians* and *Numantins*, ruined by our Progenitors. I am not for the destruction of *Corinth*, though something may be said for it, considering the situation of the place, very opportune to begin a war.

A City in Spain, which after a long siege, reduced to all extremities, was taken and destroyed by the same *Scipio*, who demolished *Carthage*.

31. Be most circumspect in keeping Faith, whosoever infringeth it, attempts against the common Guard of Mankind, and excites the Deceived to secure themselves with the Trust of new Necessities, against the Treachery of the old, and to brand him as infamously perfidious and wicked.

Conclusion.

Since therefore you see all these things, External Peace, Domestick Quiet, Common safety, and what else is desirable and dear to Mankind, are brought under the care and protection

of your power, consider your self to be placed in their Guard, as in a Watch-Tower, that by your vigilancy, and circumspection, your people may be safe. It is your part to have your eyes open for the security and benefit of all, with a ready courage, and a minde intent on all parts of the Commonwealth, wisely considering in all your Orders, Decrees, and Acts, how much you ow to the Opinion of so many men, and to their Judgments and Esteem of you.

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